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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
____________ 
 
No. 12-4308 
____________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
v. 
 
JUAN SANCHEZ, 
  Appellant 
    
____________ 
 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(No. 2-10-cr-00764-001) 
District Judge:  Honorable Cynthia M. Rufe 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
September 23, 2013 
 
____________ 
 
 
Before:  CHAGARES, VANASKIE, and SHWARTZ, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Filed: January 28, 2014) 
 
____________ 
 
OPINION  
____________ 
 
 
 
CHAGARES, Circuit Judge. 
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 Juan Sanchez appeals his conviction for possessing a firearm as a convicted felon, 
arguing that the jury convicted him based on insufficient evidence.  We hold that the 
evidence was sufficient to support the verdict, and consequently we will affirm. 
I. 
 We write solely for the parties and will therefore recount only those facts that are 
essential to our disposition.  The following facts are taken from witness testimony 
presented by the Government at trial.   
 In August 2010, police executed a search warrant at 3537 North Water Street in 
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.  Inside the house were Hilda Ortiz, her four children, and 
Sanchez.  The officers searched the second floor bedroom and found four firearms, as 
well as a Comcast bill and a hospital bill both addressed to Sanchez at 3537 North Water 
Street.  Police also found Sanchez’s wallet, which contained an identification card 
bearing his name and a different Philadelphia address.  The officers then took Sanchez 
upstairs into the bedroom so he could get dressed before going to the police station.  
After reading Sanchez his Miranda rights, police interrogated him about the guns.  He 
explained that he had owned them for over eighteen months and had forgotten that he had 
them.  He stated that he bought the guns from a person on the street who needed drugs. 
 In November 2010, Sanchez was indicted on two counts relating to possession of 
firearms.  Count two, the subject of the instant appeal, alleged that Sanchez violated 18 
U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(e) by knowingly possessing four firearms after having been 
convicted of a felony.  Sanchez elected to go to trial.  He was acquitted on count one, but 
convicted on count two.  The District Court sentenced him to 235 months of 
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imprisonment and four years of supervised release.  He now seeks to overturn his 
conviction, contending that it was based on insufficient evidence. 
II.
1
 
  A defendant seeking to overturn his conviction based on insufficiency of the 
evidence faces a formidable challenge.  “A reviewing court may set aside the jury’s 
verdict on the ground of insufficient evidence only if no rational trier of fact could have 
agreed with the jury.”  Cavazos v. Smith, 132 S. Ct. 2, 4 (2011).  “[W]e will sustain the 
verdict if there is substantial evidence to uphold the jury’s decision.”  United States v. 
Boria, 592 F.3d 476, 480 (3d Cir. 2010).
2
 
  To demonstrate that Sanchez was guilty of a violation of § 922(g)(1), the 
Government was required to prove three elements beyond a reasonable doubt:  (1) that 
Sanchez had been convicted of a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term of more 
than one year; (2) that he knowingly possessed a firearm; and (3) that the firearm traveled 
through interstate commerce.  United States v. Dodd, 225 F.3d 340, 344 (3d Cir. 2000).   
  Sanchez challenges only the Government’s evidence concerning whether he 
knowingly possessed the firearm.  He argues that his “presence alone[] at the scene of the 
crime” is not enough to demonstrate possession.  Sanchez Br. 12.  He highlights the fact 
                                              
1
 The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231.  We have appellate 
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
2
 We note that there does not appear to be any indication in the record that Sanchez 
moved for a judgment of acquittal before the District Court.  When a defendant fails to 
make such a motion, this Court ordinarily reviews a defendant’s claim regarding the 
sufficiency of the evidence for plain error.  United States v. Gordon, 290 F.3d 539, 547 
(3d Cir. 2002).  However, neither the Government nor Sanchez argues that plain error 
review applies.  The applicable standard of review makes no difference in this appeal as 
the end result will be the same under either standard. 
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that no investigators performed a fingerprint analysis to determine whether his 
fingerprints were on the firearms.  Sanchez also points out that Hilda Ortiz testified that 
he did not live at the Water Street residence and that the hospital bill was addressed to 
him at 3537 North Water Street only because she had filled out the paperwork when he 
visited the hospital.  Sanchez also relies on his own testimony, in which he stated that the 
guns were not his and that he did not live at the Water Street residence.  Based on this, 
Sanchez maintains that “[t]he discrepancies between the live testimony cannot be 
resolved in a rational way,” Sanchez Br. 15, and that we must therefore reverse his 
conviction. 
  Sanchez’s arguments must fail — in a case such as this, the jury’s principal role is 
to resolve discrepancies in testimony.  Here, the jury resolved the discrepancies in an 
undeniably rational way by rejecting the testimony supporting Sanchez and accepting the 
Government’s version of events.  Rather than establishing that no rational juror could 
have convicted him, Sanchez merely points to testimony that favors his position and asks 
us to conclude that the jury was mistaken in rejecting that testimony.  Yet there was 
myriad evidence that could have led a rational juror to conclude that Sanchez knowingly 
possessed the firearms in question:  he was at the scene of the crime, documentary 
evidence indicated that he lived at the Water Street residence, and agent Manuel Santiago 
testified that Sanchez admitted to ownership of the guns after he was arrested.  Sanchez 
essentially asks us to “usurp the role of the jury by weighing credibility and assigning 
weight to the evidence,” which we may not do after a guilty verdict.  United States v. 
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Caraballo-Rodriguez, 726 F.3d 418, 430 (3d Cir. 2013) (en banc) (quotation marks 
omitted). 
III. 
  For these reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court. 
